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	The idea  of a stored  program computer leads  immediately to
studying mental  processes as abstract computer programs.  Artificial
intelligence treats problem solving mechanisms non-biologically,  and
modern  cognitive psychology  makes information-processing  models of
the  human mind.   Alan Turing and  John von Neumann  thought of this
even before the  first computers were  working.  Both studies  proved
fruitful though difficult and  have been pursued with ever increasing
vigor.

	Progress  in  either  study, like  Darwinism  and  like  most
progress  in medicine  and biology, moves  the scientific  picture of
man's nature directly away from the  subjectivity preferred by modern
literary culture.  Full success, like successful genetic engineering,
will present individuals and society with a bewildering collection of
options.   Weizenbaum fears both the  options he can imagine  and the
rationalist world-view that computer-modeling reinforces.

	He criticizes  all present  work  in  artificial  intelligence,
information-processing-based psychology and  computer linguistics as
mere technique.   In particular  he regards  the computer linguists  as
hackers whose  work there is no point  in studying, but he explicitly
puts  no  limit  on  the  potential  problem-solving   capability  of
computers except when understanding humans is required.  His point is
moral,  and  his arguments  use  the 1960s  technology  of moralistic
invective.

	He  finds  it  immoral  for  a  scientist  to  adopt  certain
hypotheses  even  tentatively,  to  perform  certain  experiments  or
propose certain  applications -  not because  they  are dangerous  or
won't work, but because they are "obscene".  He distinguishes between
not closing  one's mind to a hypothesis (OK) and tentatively adopting
it (possibly immoral).  Also information processing models of man are
OK  in principle provided  one recognizes  that they can't  model any
"authentically human concern",  but no work  meeting his criteria  is
mentioned.

	The objectionable  hypotheses,  experiments and  applications
include  the  theory that  man  is  a simple  organism  in  a complex
environment, the idea  that all reality can  be formalized, the  idea
that what a  judge knows can be told to  a computer, some experiments
with   recombinant  DNA,  connecting   animal  brains  to  computers,
psychological  testing,   and   using  a   computer   program for
psychiatry.  Here are some of the arguments:

	On psychiatry -  %2"What can the psychiatrist's image  of his
patient  be when he sees  himself, as a therapist,  not as an engaged
human being  acting as  a  healer, but  as an  information  processor
following rules, etc.?"%1

	On connecting computers to animal brains  - %2"The first kind%1
[of application]%2  I would call simply obscene.   These are ones whose
very contemplation ought to give rise to feelings of disgust in every
civilized person."%1

	On a proposed moratorium on some DNA  experiments - %2"why do
they feel  they have to give a reason for  what they recommend at all?
Is not the overriding obligation on men, including men of science, to
exempt  life itself  from the  madness of  treating everything  as an
object,  a sufficient reason, and  one that does not  even have to be
spoken?"%1

	On science in general and pure science in particular - %2"Not
only  has  our  unbounded feeding  on  science  caused  us to  become
dependent on  it, but,  as happens  with many  other  drugs taken  in
increasing doses,  science has been  gradually converted into  a slow
acting  poison."%1 and, %2"Scientists who continue  to prattle on about
'knowledge for  its own  sake' in order  to exploit  that slogan  for
their self-serving ends have  detached science and knowledge from any
contact with the real world".%1

	A moral principle - %2"Those who know who and what they are
do not need to ask what they should do."%1

	Success in modeling the mind will raise policy issues
with both moral and factual aspects.  However, the public
entitled to decide them has more immediate concerns; imagine
asking the 1976 presidential candidates to debate whether computer
programs should do psychiatry while there are none that can.
When they become concrete, they must be discussed in terms of
costs and benefits and not in terms of "obscenity".
	
	As  in   Darwin's  time,   science  -  especially   genetics,
psychology, sociology  and (now) computer science  - is being morally
pressed to fit its theories to  "religion".  Many have given in;  few
will speak out for studying  the  genetics of  human  behavior,
computer  scientists in  unrelated  fields claimed  to have
proved that the ABM couldn't work, and physicists claim  to show that
nuclear explosions can have no  peaceful use.  When scientists
forget their  duty to pursue  truth wherever  the search leads,  when
they start  selecting facts to support comforting  world-views or the
policies of the good guys, they lose much of their value to society.